Abstract. In this paper, we propose a new logic for expressing and reasoning about probabilistic hyperproperties. Hyperproperties characterize the relation between different independent executions of a system. Probabilistic hyperproperties express quantitative dependencies between such executions. The standard temporal logics for probabilistic systems, i.e., PCTL and PCTL * can refer only to a single path at a time and, hence, cannot express many probabilistic hyperproperties of interest. The logic proposed in this paper, HyperPCTL, adds explicit and simultaneous quantification over multiple traces to PCTL. Such quantification allows expressing probabilistic hyperproperties. A model checking algorithm for the proposed logic is also given for discrete-time Markov chains.
Introduction
Four decades ago, Lamport [20] used the notion of trace properties as a means to specify the correctness of individual executions of concurrent programs. This notion was later formalized and classified by Alpern and Schneider [1] to safety and liveness properties. Temporal logics (e.g., LTL [21] and CTL [4] ) were built based on these efforts to give formal syntax and semantics to requirements of trace properties. Subsequently, verification algorithms were developed to reason about individual traces of a system.
It turns out that many interesting requirements are not trace properties. For example, important information-flow security policies such as noninterference 3 [13] and observational determinism 4 [27] cannot be expressed as properties of individual execution traces of a system. Also, service level agreement requirements (e.g., mean response time and percentage uptime) that use statistics of a system across all executions of a system are not trace properties. Rather, they are properties of sets of execution traces, also known as hyperproperties [7] . Temporal logics HyperLTL and HyperCTL * [5] have been proposed to provide a unifying framework to express and reason about hyperproperties. They allow explicit and simultaneous quantification over multiple paths to LTL and to CTL * .
Hyperproperties can also be probabilistic. Such probabilistic hyperproperties generally express probabilistic relations between independent executions of a system. For example, in information-flow security, adding probabilities is motivated by establishing a connection between information theory and information flow across multiple traces. It is also motivated by using probabilistic schedulers, which opens up an opportunity for the attacker to set up a probabilistic covert channel, whereby information is obtained by statistical inferences drawn from the relative frequency of outcomes of a repeated computation. Policies that defend against such an attempt, known as probabilistic noninterference, stipulate that the probability of every low-observable trace be the same for every lowequivalent initial state. Such policies quantify on different execution traces and the probability of reaching certain states in the independent and simultaneous executions.
Consider the following classic example [25] comprising of two threads th and th ′ : th : while h > 0 do {h ← h − 1}; l ← 2 || th
where h is an input by a high-privileged user and l is an output observable by low-privileged users. Probabilistic noninterference would require that l obtains values of 1 and 2 with the same probability, regardless of the initial value of h. However, assuming that the scheduler chooses to execute atomic statements of the threads th and th ′ iteratively with uniform probability distribution, the likely outcome of the race between the two assignments l ← 1 and l ← 2 depends on the initial value of h: the larger the initial value of h, the greater the probability that the final value of l is 2. For example, if the initial value of h is 0 in one execution, then the final value of l is 1 with probability 1/4 and 2 with probability 3/4, but for the initial value h = 5 in another independent execution we can observe the final value l = 1 with probability 1/4096 and l = 2 with probability 4095/4096. Thus, it holds that for two independent executions with initial h values 0 resp. 5 the larger h value leads to a lower probability for l = 1 upon termination. I.e., this program does not satisfy probabilistic noninterference.
It is straightforward to observe that requirements such as probabilistic noninterference cannot be expressed in existing probabilistic temporal logics such as PCTL [15] and PCTL * , as they cannot draw connection between the probability of reaching certain states in independent executions. With this motivation, in this paper, we propose the temporal logic HyperPCTL that generalizes PCTL by allowing explicit quantification over initial states and, hence, multiple computation trees simultaneously, as well as probability of occurring propositions that stipulate relationships among those traces. For the above example, the following HyperPCTL formula expresses probabilistic noninterference, which obviously does not hold:
That is, for any two executions from initial states σ and σ ′ (i.e., initial values of h), the probability distribution of terminating with value 1 = 1 (or l = 2) is uniform.
In addition to probabilistic noninterference, we show that HyperPCTL can express other important requirements and policies, some not related to informationflow security. First, we show HyperPCTL subsumes probabilistic bisimulation. We also show that HyperPCTL can express requirements such as differential privacy, quantitative information flow, and probabilistic causation (a.k.a. causality). We also present a HyperPCTL model checking algorithm for discrete-time Markov chains (DTMCs). The complexity of the algorithm is polynomial-time in the size of the input DTMC and is PSPACE-hard in the size of the input HyperPCTL formula. We also discuss a wide range of open problem to be tackled by future research. We believe that this paper opens a new area in rigorous analysis of probabilistic systems.
Organization The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the syntax and semantics of HyperPCTL. Section 3 provides a diverse set of example requirements that HyperPCTL can express. We present our model checking algorithm in Section 4. Related work is discussed in Section 5. Finally, we make concluding remarks and discuss future work in Section 6.
HyperPCTL
In this section, we present the syntax and semantics of HyperPCTL. -S is a finite nonempty set of states, -P : S ×S → [0, 1] is a transition probability function with s ′ ∈S P(s, s ′ ) = 1 for all states s ∈ S, -AP is a set of atomic propositions, and
AP is a labeling function.
A path of a Markov chain M = (S, P, AP, L) is defined as an infinite sequence π = s 0 s 1 s 2 · · · ∈ S ω of states with P(s i , s i+1 ) > 0, for all i ≥ 0; we write π[i] for s i . Let Paths s (M) denote the set of all (infinite) paths starting in s in M, and Paths s fin (M) denote the set of all finite prefixes of paths from Paths s (M), which we sometimes call finite paths.
Syntax
HyperPCTL state formulas are inductively defined by the following grammar:
where c ∈ Q, a ∈ AP is an atomic proposition, ∼∈ {<, ≤, =, ≥, >}, σ is a state variable from a countably infinite supply of variables V = {σ 1 , σ 2 , . . .}, p is a probability expressions, and ϕ is a path formula. HyperPCTL path formulas are formed according to the following grammar:
where ψ is a state formulas and
We also introduce state formulas of the form p ∈ J, where J = [l, u] ⊆ [0, 1] is an interval with rational bounds, as syntactic sugar for l ≤ p ∧ p ≤ u. We also define the syntactic sugar
We denote by F the set of all HyperPCTL state formulas.
An occurrence of an indexed atomic proposition a σ in a HyperPCTL state formula ψ is free if it is not in the scope of a quantifier bounding σ and otherwise bound ; we denote by Free(ψ) the set of all indexed atomic propositions with at least one free occurrence in ψ. HyperPCTL sentences are HyperPCTL state formulas in which all occurrences of all indexed atomic propositions are bound. HyperPCTL (quantified ) formulas are HyperPCTL sentences.
Example Consider the formula
This formula is true if for each state s 1 there exists another state s 2 such that the probability to finally reach a state labelled with a from s 1 equals the probability of reaching b from s 2 .
Semantics
We present the semantics of HyperPCTL based on n-ary self-composition of a DTMC. We emphasize that it is possible to define the semantics in terms of the non-self-composed DTMC, but it will essentially result in a very similar setting, but more difficult to understand.
The satisfaction of a HyperPCTL quantified formula by a DTMC M = (S, P, AP, L) is defined by:
where () is the empty sequence of states. Thus, the satisfaction relation |= defines the values of HyperPCTL quantified, state, and path formulas in the context of a DTMC M = (S, P, AP, L) and an n-tuple s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) ∈ S n of states (which is () for n = 0). Intuitively, the state sequence s stores instantiations for quantified state variables. Remember that HyperPCTL quantified formulas are sentences. The semantics evaluates HyperPCTL formulas by structural recursion. Quantifiers are instantiated and the instantiated values for state variables are stored in the state sequence s. To maintain the connection between a state in this sequence and the state variable which it instantiates, we introduce the auxiliary syntax a i with a ∈ AP and i ∈ N >0 , and if we instantiate σ in ∃σ.ψ or ∀σ.ψ by state s, then we append s at the end of the state sequence and replace all a σ that is bound by the given quantifier by a i with i being the index of s in the state sequence. We will express the meaning of path formulas based on the n-ary self-composition of M; the index i for the instantiation of σ also fixes the component index in which we keep track of the paths starting in σ. The semantics judgment rules are the following:
where ψ, ψ 1 and ψ 2 are HyperPCTL state formulas; the substitution ψ[AP n+1 /AP σ ] replaces for each atomic proposition a ∈ AP each free occurrence of a σ in ψ by a n+1 ; a ∈ AP is an atomic proposition and 1 ≤ i ≤ n; p 1 and p 2 are probability expressions and ∼∈ {<, ≤, =, ≥, >}; ϕ is a HyperPCTL path formula and c is a rational constant. The satisfaction relation for HyperPCTL path formulas is defined as follows, where π is a path of M n for some n ∈ N >0 ; ψ, ψ 1 , and ψ 2 are HyperPCTL state formulas and k ∈ N ≥0 :
Note that the semantics assures that each path formula ϕ is evaluated in the context of a path of M n such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n for each a i in ϕ.
Example Consider the DTMC M in Fig. 1 and the following HyperPCTL formula: This formula is satisfied by M if for all pairs of initial states (labelled by the atomic proposition init) the probability to satisfy a is the same, i.e., for each (
. The probability of reaching a from s 0 is 0.4 + (0.2 × 0.2) = 0.44. Moreover, the probability of reaching a from s 1 is 0.3 + (0.7 × 0.2) = 0.44. Hence, we have M |= ψ.
HyperPCTL in Action
We now put HyperPCTL into action by formulating probabilistic requirements from different areas, such as information-flow security, privacy, and causality analysis.
Probabilistic Bisimulation
A bisimulation is an equivalence relation over a set of states of a system such that equivalent states cannot be distinguished by observing their behaviors. In the context of DTMC states and PCTL properties, a probabilistic bisimulation is an equivalence relation over the DTMC states such that any two equivalent states satisfy the same PCTL formulas. The latter property can be assured inductively by requiring that equivalent states have the same labels and the probability to move from them to any of the equivalence classes is the same.
Assume a partitioning
, is a fresh atomic proposition not in AP, and
Probabilistic Noninterfence
Noninterference is an information-flow security policy that enforces that a lowprivileged user (e.g., an attacker) should not be able to distinguish two computations from their publicly observable outputs if they only vary in their inputs by a high-privileged user (e.g., a secret). Probabilistic noninterference [17] establishes connection between information theory and information flow by employing probabilities to address covert channels. Intuitively, it requires that the probability of every low-observable trace pattern is the same for every low-equivalent initial state. Probabilistic noninterference can be expressed in HyperPCTL as follows:
where l denotes a low-observable atomic proposition. Observe that formula ϕ pni is a simplification of formula ϕ pb in Section 3.1. In fact, most approaches to prove probabilistic noninterference is by showing probabilistic bisimulation with respect to low-observable propositions.
Quantitative Information Flow
Roughly speaking, the quantitative information flow (QIF) problem is concerned with the amount of information that an attacker can learn about the high security input by executing the program and observing the low security output, i.e., the difficulty of guessing the secret input from the channel output. QIF aims at quantifying the amount of information in a high security input H (e.g., a password), which is the attacker's initial uncertainty, from the amount of information leaked to a low security output L (e.g., the result of a password verification), and the amount of unleaked information about H (the attacker's remaining uncertainty). For example, consider the following two programs:
Although discrete noninterference would characterize both as insecure, QIF characterizes P 1 as "more" secure than P 2 . QIF is founded on information-theoretic concepts (e.g., Shannon/min/guessentropy) that can compute the amount of leaked bits of a high security input [3, 6, 17, 19] . The bounding problem [26] is to determine whether that amount is bounded from above by a constant q. Assuming that the values of the high input security H to the program are uniformly distributed, each given in a different initial state, and the program outputs a value from L only once at termination, a simple QIF policy [8] is (1) starting from any high input, the probability of reaching any of the low-observable output is bounded by log |L| log |H| , and (2) starting from every pair of high inputs, the probability of reaching the same low-observable output is the same. This QIF policy can be formulated in HyperPCTL as follows:
where l labels states where a different low security output from L is observed.
Differential Privacy
Differential privacy [9] is a commitment by a data holder to a data subject (normally an individual) that he/she will not be affected by allowing his/her data to be used in any study or analysis. Formally, let ǫ be a positive real number and A be a randomized algorithm that makes a query to an input database and produces an output. Algorithm A is called ǫ-differentially private, if for all databases D 1 and D 2 that differ on a single element, and all subsets S of possible outputs of A, we have:
Differential privacy can be expressed in HyperPCTL by the following formula:
where dbSim(σ, σ ′ ) means that two different dataset inputs have all but one similarity and qOut is the result of the query. For example, one way to provide differential privacy is through randomized response in order to create noise and provide plausible deniability. Let A be an embarrassing or illegal activity. In a social study, each participant is faced with the query, "Have you engaged in activity A in the past week?" and is instructed to respond by the following protocol:
1. Flip and coin. Thus, a "Yes" response may have been offered because the first and second coin flips were both heads. This implies that, there are no good or bad responses and an answer cannot be incriminating.
We now show that this social study is (ln 3)-deferentially private. For each participant in the study, Fig. 2 shows the Markov chain of the response protocol, where {t=y} (respectively, {t=n}) denotes that the truth is that the participant did (respectively, did not) engage in activity A, and {r=y} (respectively, {r=n}) means that the participant responds "Yes" (respectively, "No"). The HyperPCTL formula is the following:
Observe that compared to formula ψ dp , we have decomposed dbSim(σ, σ ′ ) to two cases of t = y and t = n. Thus, in the left conjunct, the set S represents the case where the response is "Yes" and in the right conjunct, the set S represents the case where the response is "No". It is straightforward to see that the DTMC in Fig. 2 satisfies the formula, when for the left conjunct σ and σ ′ are instantiated by s 0 and s 1 , respectively, and for the right conjunct σ and σ ′ are instantiated by s 1 and s 0 , respectively.
Probabilistic Causation
Probabilistic causation [11] aims to characterize the relationship between cause and effect using the tools of probability theory. The reason for using probabilities is that most causes are not invariably followed by their effects. For example, smoking is a cause of lung cancer, even though some smokers do not develop lung cancer and some people who have lung cancer are not smokers. Thus, we need to somehow express that some causes are more likely to develop an effect. Specifically, the central idea in probabilistic causation is to assert that the probability of occurring effect e if cause c happens is higher than the probability of occurring e when c does not happen. We can express the most basic type of probabilistic causation in HyperPCTL as follows:
Observe that we assume that the occurrence or absence of the cause is persistent (hence, the until operator). Also, expressing causation in the standard PCTL by stripping the state quantifiers in formula ψ pc1 will damage the meaning of causation. The resulting PCTL formula captures the causation relation from each initial state in isolation and it wrongly allows the probability of (c U e) from one initial state to be less than the probability of (¬c U e) from another initial state. One problem with formula ψ pc1 is spurious correlations. For example, if c is the drop in the level of mercury in a barometer, and e is the occurrence of a storm, then the above formula may hold in a system, though c is not really the cause of e. In fact, the real cause for both is the drop in atmospheric pressure. To address this problem, we add a constraint, where there should be no further event a that screens off e from c [22] :
The negation behind the existential quantifier can be pushed inside to obtain a proper HyperPCTL formula. We note that for simplicity, in formula ψ pc2 , propositions a and c occur in the same state in σ ′′ . A more general way is to allow a happen before or simultaneously with c. Finally, we note that other concepts in probabilistic causation such as Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle and Fork Asymmetry [22] (which emulates the second law of thermodynamics), as well as Skyrms's Background Contexts [24] can be expressed in a similar fashion.
HyperPCTL Model Checking
In the following, we show that the HyperPCTL model checking problem is decidable by introducing a model checking algorithm. The space complexity of our algorithm is exponential in the number of quantifiers of the input formula, because for n state quantifiers, we build the n-ary self-composition of the input DTMC. We are uncertain whether there exists a PSPACE algorithm, but we show the PSPACE-hardness of the problem.
Let M = (S, P, AP, L) be a DTMC and ψ be a HyperPCTL quantified formula with n state quantifiers. Informally, our model checking algorithm decides whether M |= ψ as follows (detailed pseudo-code is formulated in the Algorithms 1-3):
1. If n = 0, then ψ contains constants only; evaluate ψ and return the result. 2. Otherwise, if n > 0, then apply variable renaming such that the quantified state variables are named σ 1 , . . . , σ n . 3. Build the self-composition M n .
Compute a labelingL
n (s) for all states s ∈ S n of M n as follows. Initiallŷ L n (s) = ∅ for all s ∈ S n (Line 3 in Algorithm 1). For all sub-formulas ψ ′ of ψ inside-out do the following:
-If the subformula ψ ′ has the form true, add true to the label setsL n (s) of all states s ∈ S n (Line 3 in Algorithm 2).
Algorithm 1: HyperPCTL model checking algorithm I
-If the subformula ψ ′ is an atomic proposition a σi , add a σi to the label set of each state s ∈ S n with a i ∈ L n (s) (Line 5 in Algorithm 2).
n with ψ 1 ∈L n (s) and ψ 2 ∈L n (s) (Lines 6 -9 in Algorithm 2). -If the subformula ψ ′ is ¬ψ 1 , then add ¬ψ 1 toL n (s) for each s ∈ S n with ψ 1 ∈L n (s) (Lines 10 -12 in Algorithm 2).
, then compute for all P(ϕ) appearing in p 1 ∼ p 2 (respectively, p ∈ J) for all states s ∈ S n the probability that ϕ holds in s using standard PCTL model checking, and add for all s ∈ S n the property p 1 ∼ p 2 (respectively, p ∈ J) toL n (s) if p 1 ∼ p 2 (respectively, p ∈ J) evaluates to true in s (Lines 13 -16 in Algorithm 2).
-If the subformula ψ ′ is of the form ∃σ i .ψ 1 , then label all states s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) ∈ S n with ∃σ i .ψ 1 iff there exists an s
. . , s n ) (Lines 20 -22 in Algorithm 2). 5. Upon termination of the above iterative labeling procedure, as ψ is a sentence and thus state-independent, either all states are labelled with it or none of them. Return true if for an arbitrary state s we have ψ ∈L n (s) and return false otherwise.. Proof. We show that the HyperPCTL model checking problem is PSPACE-hard by reducing the following PSPACE-hard quantified Boolean formula (QBF) satisfiability problem [12] to it:
Algorithm 2: HyperPCTL model checking algorithm II
Output : An extension ofL n to label each state s ∈ S n with sub-formulas of ψ that hold in
for all states s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S n with ψ1 ∈L n (s ′ ) for some s Given is a set {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n } of Boolean variables and a quantified Boolean formula
where Q i ∈ {∀, ∃} for each i ∈ [1, n] and ψ is an arbitrary Boolean formula over variables {x 1 , . . . , x n }. Is y true?
We reduce the satisfiability problem for a quantified Boolean formula to the model checking problem for a HyperPCTL formula with the same quantifier structure as follows. We define the simple DTMC M = (S, P, AP, L) shown in Fig. 3 , which contains two states s 0 and s 1 and has two paths s (2) ps = 1 for all states s ∈ S n with ψ2 ∈L n (s)
for each s ∈ S n set P n 0 (s) = 1 if ψ2 ∈L n (s) and P n 0 (s) = 0 otherwise
HyperPCTL formula in our mapping is the following: where ψ ′ is constructed from ψ by replacing every occurrence of a variable x i in ψ by x σi . The given quantified Boolean formula is true if and only if the DTMC obtained by our mapping satisfies HyperPCTL formula (1). We translate every assignment to the trace quantifiers to a corresponding assignment of the Boolean variables, and vice versa, as follows: Assigning state s 0 (s 1 ) to σ i means that x i is set to true (false).
Related Work
Probabilistic noninterference [16, 17] establishes connection between information theory and information flow by employing probabilities to address covert channels. Intuitively, it requires that the probability of every pattern of low-observable trace be the same for every low-equivalent initial state. Most efforts in reasoning about probabilistic noninterference is through probabilistic weak bisimulation (e.g. [25] ). More recently, Sabelfeld and Sands [23] introduce a framework to ensure nonintereference for multi-threaded programs, where a probabilistic scheduler non-deterministically manages the execution of threads. They introduce operational semantics for a simple imperative language with dynamic thread creation, and how compositionality is ensured.
Epistemic logic [10] is a subfield of modal logic that is concerned with reasoning about knowledge. The semantic model of the logic is a Kripke structure, where a set of agents are related with each other based on which states they consider possible. A probabilistic version of the logic [14] assigns a probability function to each agent at each state such that its domain is a non-empty subset of the set of possible states. Epistemic temporal logic has been used to express information-flow security policies (e.g., [2] ). The relation between the expressive power of probabilistic epistemic logic and HyperPCTL remains an open question in this paper. Gray and Syverson [18] propose a modal logic for multi-level reasoning about security of probabilistic systems. The logic is axiomatic and is based on Halpern and Tuttle [14] framework for reasoning about knowledge and probability. The logic is sound, but it may run into undecidability.
Clarkson and Schneider [7] introduce the notion of hyperproperties, a settheoretic framework for expressing security policies. A hyperproperty is a set of sets of traces. In other words, a hyperproperty is a second-order property of properties. The expressive power of hyperproperties do not exceed the secondorder logic, but it is currently unclear whether the full power of second-order logic is needed to express hyperproperties of interest. Clarkson and Schneider have shown two fundamental things: (1) a hyperproperty is an intersection of a safety and a liveness hyperproperty, and (2) hyperproperties can express many important requirements such as information-flow security policies (e.g., nonintereference, observational determinism, etc), service-level agreement, etc.
Second-order logic is not verifiable in general, as it cannot be effectively and completely axiomatized. Thus, temporal logics for subclasses of hyperproperties have emerged [5] . HyperLTL and HyperCTL * allow explicit and simultaneous quantification over multiple paths to LTL and to CTL * , respectively. As the names suggest, HyperLTL allow quantification of linear traces and HyperCTL * permits quantification over multiple execution traces simultaneously while allowing branching-time paths for each trace. HyperLTL and HyperCTL * are not equipped with probabilistic operators and cannot reason about probabilistic systems.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we proposed the temporal logic HyperPCTL to express and reason about probabilistic hyperproperties. HyperPCTL is a natural extension to PCTL by allowing explicit and simultaneous quantification over model states. We defined the syntax and semantics and presented a model checking algorithm for discretetime Markov chains. The complexity of the algorithm is PSPACE-hard in the number of quantifiers in the input HyperPCTL formula. We presented multiple examples from different domains, where HyperPCTL can elegantly express the requirements.
We believe the results in this paper paves the path for new research directions. As for future work, an important unanswered question in this paper is to determine tighter lower and upper bounds for the the complexity of HyperPCTL model checking in the size of the formula. We believe most of the literature and fundamental lines of research on PCTL verification should now be revisited in the context of HyperPCTL. Examples include HyperPCTL model checking for Markov decision processes (MDPs), Markov chains with costs, parameter synthesis and model repair for probabilistic hyperproperties, HyperPCTL conditional probabilities, developing abstraction/refinement, comparing expressive power to existing related logics such as probabilistic epistemic logic [14] , etc. An orthogonal direction is deeper investigation of the examples presented in Section 3. Each of those areas (e.g., differential privacy and probabilistic causation) deserve more research to develop effective and efficient model checking techniques.
